were evolved, until the huge carbon compounds that we find as colloidal aggregates were formed. With every increase of complexity, properties arose which had not before been manifested; and the first formation of each such compound was an instance of emergence (or emergent evolution) of the new property possessed and manifested.

Now, the feature of the scheme which has rendered it attractive to so many minds is that the peculiar properties of living things are said to have emerged in just the same way as the new properties of molecules (larger and more complex than had previously existed) had emerged in earlier stages of this so-called evolutionary process. And, further, that at a later date (as Herbert Spencer suggested as long ago as 1851) complexity of aggregation of organic units being carried to a still higher point (in the brains of higher animals) resulted in the emergence of consciousness.

Throughout the process the dynamic factors, the forces and energies concerned, have been, it is alleged, the same; but they have acted in increasingly complex conjunctions. And when at last consciousness emerged, it was as an epiphenomenal consciousness, a passive spectator of the scene, a spectator incapable of so much as raising a finger to signify approval or disapproval.

In this form the doctrine of emergent evolution is an adjunct, an aider and abettor of the mechanical biology. For it is alleged by some and implied by others that every new emergent was in principle impredictible and that its nature has no intelligible ground in the

conjunction of things from which it emerges. From which it follows that the emergence of mind was no more mysterious than the emergence of acidity or resilience. To point to the emergence in the course of the cooling process of larger molecules and more complex physical systems with their